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Abstract
We study equity risk premiums in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic.
1 Introduction and Summary of Results
COVID-19 is shorthand for the novel corona virus disease with origins in Wuhan, China in the
fall of 2019. It spread in 2020 to become a global pandemic. As of this writing (late April,
2020), there have been approximately 3 million identified cases worldwide, and 200,000 deaths.
Of those, the US totals are approximately 946,000 cases and 53,000 deaths1. Fig. 15 shows the
daily US development to date.
Worldwide, governments have urged or mandated shelter-in-place policies, and mandated
shutdowns of most ‘non-essential’ business. In the US this approach has achieved the immediate
goal of buying time for hospitals to prepare for future COVID-19 patients and not be over-
whelmed by current ones.
But, broad lock-downs are unsustainable for more than a few months. Indeed, many US
states are preparing to carefully open up in mid-May and beyond. The lock-downs have resulted
in enormous economic stress. In the US: 27 million lost jobs and counting at this juncture.
These health and economic issues have been a key driver of recent extreme volatility in financial
markets. Fig. 16 shows the S&P500 index levels and returns during 2020. For perspective, note
that in normal times, a ±3% move would merit a mention and explanation on the nightly news.
Here, we study an interesting and important financial question: what new return expecta-
tions have accompanied all this increased volatility? At first glance, expectations might seem
impossible to discern. Indeed, getting an answer is rather subtle and requires both the options
market and estimates of risk aversion.
Risk averse investors hold equities only if they feel they will be fairly compensated for the
perceived risks. Fair compensation, in the aggregate, is called the “equity risk premium” (ERP).
More carefully, the ERP is the market’s forward-looking, expected rate of return – after sub-
tracting an available riskless rate (say a US Treasury rate). Because of the subtraction, it’s called
an excess return. Thus, the ERP can be thought of as the “required (excess) rate of return”,
conditioned on what the market knows, to keep all stocks held. Another way to say it: what
excess return is needed to clear the equity markets?
Expectations both require a horizon and change with the passage of time: the market learns
new things. Thus, each day t, we have ERPt,T where the T are various time horizons. Our
horizons range from one day ahead to just under 3 years. Fixing t, a graph of ERPt,T vs. T
is an ERP term structure plot. Unlike a familiar interest rate term structure (a yield curve),
the ERP term structure is not directly visible and needs to be estimated. Like a yield curve,
regardless of the time to the horizon, we always quote ERP’s as annual percentage rates.
∗Newport Beach, California, USA; email: alewis@financepress.com
1source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
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We study the effect of the pandemic events on the ERP term structures in the United States,
from late January through mid-April 2020. Estimates are found using the methods recently
developed in (Lewis, 2019). We take the S&P500 Index as a broad equity market proxy. Then,
in brief, daily S&P 500 index option quotes are combined with estimates of a risk-aversion
parameter κ to develop the ERP term structures. We briefly review how that works in Sec. 2
below. Further computational details may be found in Appendix 2 here and the Lewis article.
What have I learned? In Sec. 3, one finds the detailed results. My approach is to present
brief key-event timelines, show corresponding ERP’s, and supply some brief commentary. ERP
plots come with a central estimate (dotted) surrounded by an uncertainty interval in gray.
Unsurprisingly, there is a strong general association between volatility (VIX levels, for exam-
ple, as seen in Fig. 17) and the ERP’s. It is well-known that when the market gets very stressed
by something, VIX rises and the whole VIX term structure ‘inverts’. In other words, short-term
(risk-neutral) volatility expectations rise above long-term ones. Correspondingly, the ERP term
structure also strongly inverts. During the pandemic, this ERP inversion first happened circa
Feb 24, 2020; it remained inverted through the end of the study data on Apr 15, 2020.
Qualitatively, based upon my earlier experience with the model in (Lewis, 2019), I expected
to see these strong inversions. But, I was surprised, quantitatively, by the extraordinary heights
reached by the short-term ERP’s during mid-March 2020. For example, the March 12 term
structure (Fig. 10) shows the short-dated (one day horizon) ERP reaching a mid-point estimate
of approximately 540% per year! For comparison, long-run ERP estimates typically lie in the
3-6% per year range. Indeed, 3-6% characterized the pandemic-period US market through mid-
February. ERP levels as high as the March 12 ones may be record-setting. To say for sure requires
applying the current methodology to option quotes during the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis – this
has not yet been done.
Finally, some related analysis and updates will be provided in follow-up research to be posted
online. See the Outlook at the end for how to locate that.
2 Brief recap of the ERP model
In this section we give a brief, technical explanation of how the ERP’s are computed. If you’re
not interested in these details, feel free to skip ahead to the results in Sec. 3.
With Et denoting a (real-world) expectation conditional on date-t information It – broadly
speaking: the “state of the world” – we define:
ERPt,T = Et
[
Ret,T
]
−Rft,T = Et
[
Ret,T −R
f
t,T
]
, where at time t : (1)
• Ret,T is a future random total return on the equity market from t to T , and
• Rft,T is a time-t observable risk-free return (using US Treasury instruments).
Returns in (1) are simple total returns: Ret,T = (S¯T − S¯t)/S¯t, where S¯ is a total-return index
incorporating reinvested dividends. (Without a bar, St is the price series without dividends).
Call Ret,T −R
f
t,T the excess total return. Like interest rates, we’ll always give estimated ERP’s on
an annualized percentage basis. For those, we multiply the ERP calculated from (1) by 100×fann,
where the annualization factor fann = 1/(T − t), with time measured in years.
With logarithmic variables X¯T = log S¯T /S¯t, and corresponding probability density pX¯T (x),
(1) is equivalent to
ERPt,T =
∫
expX¯T (x) dx − (1 +R
f
t,T ). (2)
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How do we find pX¯T (x)? It turns out that, from the options market (specifically, options on the
SPX index), we can estimate a closely related probability density qX¯T (x), the so-called “risk-
neutral” density. A simple transformation between them exists under the additional assumption
that investors in the aggregate can be characterized as having a constant measure of risk-aversion,
which we write as κ. Pronounced “kappa”, it’s a single number, which I have estimated from
historical SPX returns as κ = 3± 0.5. More carefully, it’s called the Coefficient of Relative Risk
Aversion and has been heavily studied.2 Indeed, to get from q to p, one just applies a simple
exponential transformation
pX¯T (x) =
eκx qX¯T (x)∫
eκxqX¯T (x) dx
. (3)
OK – so how do we find qX¯T (x)? My approach estimates q by parameterizing it as a Gaussian
mixture model. Specifically, I take
qXT (x) =
N∑
i=1
wi
e−(x−µiτ)
2/(2σ2i τ)√
2piσ2i τ
, (4)
where τ = T − t, and N is a small integer (5 in my fits). The fitted parameters are N positive
weights, {wi}, and 2N drifts and volatilities, {µi, σi}. After a normalization and martingale
condition, this leaves 3N − 2 free parameters at each (t, T ) pair associated to a trade date and
an option expiration. Free parameters are adjusted to fit option quotes: minimizing an objective
function given in (Lewis, 2019). Finally, after algebra, now find – on an annualized percent basis:
ERP
(ann%)
t,T (κ) =
100
T − t
×
{(
eδt,T τ
N∑
i=1
w˜i e
αi+(κ+
1
2
)vi
)
− ert,T τ
}
,
using τ = T − t, αi = µiτ, vi = σ
2
i τ,
γi = καi +
1
2κ
2vi, and w˜i = wie
γi/
N∑
i=1
wie
γi .
(5)
New parameters which have just appeared are rt,T and δt,T : the cost-of-carry parameters. They
correspond to the continuously compounded riskless rate and dividend yield associated to option
expiration T . For example, if Ct,T and Pt,T denote call and put prices with strike K, we have
the model-independent, put-call parity relation:
Ct,T − Pt,T = St e
−δt,T τ −K e−rt,T τ = e−rt,T τ (Ft,T −K), (6)
where Ft,T is an (option-implied) forward price.
Once all the parameters are estimated, we evaluate (5) with κ = 3 to get the mid-point
estimates (dotted lines) for all the ERP charts in Sec. 3. Similarly, we use κ = 2.5 and κ = 3.5
to estimate the lower and upper bounds to the uncertainty intervals (gray).
Appendix 2 discusses the computational details that either differ from the discussion in
(Lewis, 2019) or would be unresolved if you simply turned to that reference.
2My estimates are in line with one of the most classical of these studies (Friend & Blume, 1975). See (Lewis,
2019) for further commentary.
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3 Timelines with Equity Risk Premium Term Structures
3.1 Early days
Fig. 1 shows some early events in the development of the pandemic.3
Figure 1: Timeline 1
Wuhan placed under quarantine
First case outside China reported in Thailand
First death in China recorded
Identification of new virus: SARS-CoV-2
Wuhan's wholesale seafood market shutdown
China alerts WHO about several pneumonia cases
First patient develops symptoms of Wuhan coronavirus
Dec-09 Dec-23 Jan-06 Jan-20
Wuhan, China was placed under quarantine on Jan 23, 2020, with rail and services suspended.
Two days earlier, on Jan 21, the first US case was identified in Washington state – a man in his
30’s who had returned from a trip to Wuhan. Fig 2 shows the estimated ERP term structure.
It’s within typical long-run ERP estimates of 3-6% per year: the US equity market was not
concerned.
Figure 2: US ERP term structure
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3Timeline events are drawn from the World Economic Forum (https://www.weforum.org), the Wall Street
Journal of Mar 21-22 2020, Zack’s Equity Research (Stock market news), and misc. online news sources.
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3.2 First death in Europe
Fig. 3 shows some next events in the development of the pandemic.
Figure 3: Timeline 2
First European COVID-10 death announced in France
3600 pasengers are quarantined on Diamond Princess cruise ship
First death outside China (Philippines)
US restricts entry by foreign nationals with recent China travel
WHO declares a Public Health Emergency
US 1st confirmed case, WA state
Jan-27 Feb-03 Feb-10 Feb-17
Feb 14, 2020 marks the end of this segment with the announcement of the first European COVID-
19 death, in France. Fig 4 shows the estimated ERP term structure. I think it’s fair to say the
US equity market remained in “business as usual” mode.
Figure 4: US ERP term structure
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3.3 Italy starts lockdowns
Fig. 5 shows some next events in the development of the pandemic.
Figure 5: Timeline 3
Italy sees a major surge of cases and many towns are locked down
A church in South Korea is linked to a surge of cases
Iran announces two COVID-19 cases
Feb-19 Feb-20 Feb-21 Feb-22 Feb-23
Feb 23, 2020 marks the end of this segment with start of lock-downs in Italy. As seen in Fig. 6,
the ERP chart for the next day, the market is now definitely paying attention. The S&P500 has
fallen 4.7% from its record peak of 3386.15 on Feb 19, and the CBOE’s VIX index has risen to
25.03. Fig 6 shows the estimated ERP term structure. It’s become strongly inverted with the
short-term ERP (the “required return”) rising to about 40%. Note the long end of the curve,
representing the Dec 21, 2022 maturity – about 2.8 years away. It’s around 8%, slightly higher
but not too far from the longer-term value in the previous plots.
Figure 6: US ERP term structure
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3.4 Early March – the Fed acts
Fig. 7 shows some events from late February and early March.
Figure 7: Timeline 4
Fed cuts rates, but market falls 2.8%
S&P 500 rallies 4.6% on anticipation of Fed interest rate cut
First US death. Travel restrictions are announced
First case in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria)
Feb-28 Feb-29 Mar-01 Mar-02 Mar-03 Mar-04
Early March begins a Federal Reserve monetary policy response. On Mar 2, 2020 the market
rallies by almost 5% – likely anticipating an interest rate cut. The VIX index (which closed
at 40.1 on Feb 28), correspondingly eased to 33.4 on Mar 2. Indeed, the Fed announces a rate
cut on Mar 3, the first unscheduled, emergency rate cut since the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis.
However, the market fell and the VIX climbed back to 36.8.
In general, VIX’s above 40 are a sign of a very high level of systematic market stress (see
Fig. 17). The associated ERP term structure (Fig. 8) significantly steepens from our last plot,
showing an estimated short-term required return of 100-130 percent per annum.
Figure 8: US ERP term structure
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3.5 Mid March I – time to panic
Fig. 9 shows some events from mid-March.
Figure 9: Timeline 5
US announces a 30-day ban on some travel from Europe
Italy q	
 US e trigger circuit bfffi 1flffi T ! hits record l"# of 0.5%
O$% falls (&'()/R*+,-. argue)
Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-10 Mar-12
The week of Mar 9-13 is very ugly on many fronts. COVID-19 cases are rising exponentially in
Europe and the US. In the absence of mitigation, there are predictions of millions of deaths to
occur in the US before so-called ‘herd immunity’ is achieved. A vaccine is predicted to be at
least 18 months away, and not certain even then.
On Thurs Mar 12, 2020, the VIX index closes at 75.5% and the short-term (1-day) annualized
ERP reaches 500-600% (see Fig. 8). Although hard to discern in the chart, the ERP over the
longest term (2 34 years) has risen to approximately 17% annualized. Credit markets are highly
stressed.
Figure 10: US ERP term structure
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3.6 Mid March II – lockdowns, the IHME becomes influential
Fig. 11 shows some events from mid-March.
Figure 11: Timeline 6
CA governor Newsom declares statewide shutdown
Trump backs massive stimulus plan
US stocks have worst day since Oct '87 crash
Sunday: Fed cuts benchmark rate to near 0
Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18 Mar-19 Mar-20 Mar-21
By the end of Mar 16-20 week, stresses begin to ease somewhat: see Fig. 12. The short-term
ERP estimate ended the week at 200-250%, the lowest of the week. VIX ended at 66.
What prompted the ease? Prospective stimulus likely helped. Also, the U. Washington’s
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) was gaining influence.4 Their earliest pre-
dictions (Mar 25), based upon curve fitting to the Wuhan experience, suggested cumulative US
deaths to total 38,000-162,000 through Aug 2020 – premised on lock-downs. These estimates
were significantly lower than the previous ‘millions’ of others (without mitigation), and not ter-
ribly disproportionate to the annual mortality from the flu. Indeed, as time passed, the IHME
US death estimates were tightened and lowered: 48,000-123,000 at this writing (late April 2020),
with 54,000 actual deaths to date.
Figure 12: US ERP term structure
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4See https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america
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3.7 Late March to mid-April – signs of optimism
Fig. 13 shows some events through April 15, 2020.
Figure 13: Timeline 7
CDFGHI starts to ease JKLMNQSUV
WXYZ [\]^_ Johnson enters `ac for dfghi (jkmno rpstuvwx)
yz{|}~ cases reach 1 
Ł case  reaches    ¡¢£¤
¥¦§¨© ª«¬­®¯°±² ³´µ¶· ¸¹º»¼ ½¾¿ÀÁÂÃÄÅ ÆÇÈÉÊ ËÌÍÎÏ ÐÑÒÓ
Mar-ÔÕ Mar-Ö× ØÙÚ-06 ÛÜÝ-Þß
April 15, 2020 marks the end of our ERP study. The last timeline events reflect increased
optimism that (at least the initial phase of) the pandemic has plateaued or peaked in many
areas of the world. VIX ended at 40.8, and the short-term ERP has fallen to the 50-60% range.
The long end of the ERP curve remains quite elevated at 16.7%.
Figure 14: US ERP term structure
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4 Outlook and Future Work
The outlook for the course of the pandemic and the economy at this writing is encouraging. For
example, in New York state, the hardest hit US state, hospitalizations are down significantly
from a month ago. Encouraged by that, Governor Andrew Cuomo, says he will extend the
PAUSE regulations in many parts of the state, but some less-affected regions can reopen on May
15. I hope to see the same in my state, California. It’s clear that reopening will be done carefully
everywhere, with social distancing and protective measures an ongoing recommended part of life
for many months to come.
There are many to-be-answered questions: what exactly is the mortality rate, how many have
been infected, are infected but asymptomatic or recovered people now immune, etc? Several
recent studies suggest that the mortality rate is much lower than many original estimates.
In terms of my financial analysis here, there are also some unanswered questions. For ex-
ample, what exactly is the risk-return trade-off here? This can be answered by computing the
(annualized) variance rate σ2t,T associated to the inferred real-world p-distributions, and plotting
ERPt,T vs. σ
2
t,T . Another project on my “to-do” list is to organize the ERP’s for standardized
maturities, say 3 days, 1 week, 1 month, and so on. Finally, I would like to continue to update
the results as time progresses. As I work through these projects, I’ll update this preprint.
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5 Appendix 1 – Basic reference charts
Figure 15: US COVID-19 development through late April 2020
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Figure 16: S&P500 Index: levels and percent returns
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Figure 17: VIX Index: longer run and latest one year
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6 Appendix 2 – More computational details
Here, I discuss some differences from my previous study: (Lewis, 2019).
Data. As in my previous study, option quotes were sourced from the CBOEs LiveVol service:
“End-of-Day Option Quotes with Calcs”. These quotes are recorded at 15:45 New York time, 15
minutes from the close of the regular session. The CBOE advertises them as a “more accurate
snapshot of market liquidity than the end of day market”.
With my previous study data, every non-zero bid option was accompanied by a larger non-
zero ask. In my data for this study, which was sampled almost completely for all SPX trade
dates and quotes from Jan 2, 2020 through April 15, 2020, there were a few exceptions to this
rule. For example, on March 16, 2020 there were some quotes for the Dec 16, 2022 expiration
showing a bid> 0 but an ask=0. I sent a query to the CBOE and a staff person explained that,
first an ask=0 value should be interpreted as “no ask present”. And similarly on the bid side.
He also explained that this can occur as “Liquidity providers temporarily vacate the quoting
environment to protect themselves while they re-evaluate their assumptions”. There were very
few instances of this, and my procedures seemed to suffer no ill-effects by simply ignoring these
strikes. Nevertheless, I thought it was unusual and worth reporting.
Dual expirations. In my previous study, I included both AM and PM options on the Fridays
where these both occurred. These were treated as distinct expirations because times were mea-
sured to 15 min accuracy. Here, for simplicity, for such dual expirations, only the PM options
were included. However, certainly the AM options were included here for any expiration when
those were the sole options expiring. Also for simplicity, all times T here (in years), were simply
measured as T=(days)/365, where days was the integer number of days from the trade date to
the expiration date.
Cost-of-carry methodology. I adopted the put-call parity regression method of the previous
study. One change was that I only included 50% of the put-call pairs: those closest to the
money. For very short-dated expirations, while the regression method produces very plausible
forward prices (which are key), the inferred interest rate and dividend yield are rather erratic,
often negative. This erratic effect was lessoned by the 50% inclusion (the previous study using
100%). The previous study showed that two different cost-of-carry methods will produce almost
identical ERP’s as long as the inferred forward prices are similar.
Simplified rules. In my previous study, besides my nominal objective function, I also adopted
a secondary objective related to certain OutStats, which are explained there. I sought to achieve
my secondary objective by switching the number of Gaussian components from N=4 to N=5, or
making other adjustments such as introducing a minimum bid on put quotes higher than the 0.05
non-zero minimum characteristic of SPX options. Here, for both simplicity and efficiency, I fixed
on N=5 Gaussian components for the entire study and always included every out-of-the-money
option quote with both a non-zero bid and non-zero ask. I declared these to be “simplified rules”,
and confirmed that all the ERP’s of my previous study were reproduced to 3 good digits under
my simplified rules.
The OutStats here were not as good as in my previous study, but generally I found my
ERP’s to be quite robust to my choices for various optimizer parameters. Optimizer pa-
rameters consisted of the PrecisionGoal (PG=4), the maximum number of optimizer steps
(MAXSTEPS=600), and a scaling parameter (sigMULT=1.2). This last one fixed the upper limit
of the allowed fitted volatility to be sigMULT × IVMAX, where the second term was the highest
implied volatility observed at that expiration. On a few expirations, if the OutStats looked
particularly poor, I would try a rerun with MAXSTEPS=1000, or PG=5 or sigMULT=1.4.
Typically, the fit would improve, but with the ERP either unchanged or only changing slightly.
That’s what I mean by ‘robust’. Overall, I think my estimates are good to three digits.
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